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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of China’s export expansion on Malaysian monthly 
trading with to her 12 major trading partners over the liberalization era. Structural 
break(s) found mostly coincides with the Asia financial crisis and China’s accession 
into WTO and, regime shifts are evident in the long run relationship among the 
variables being studied. While the income effects are more apparent, real exchanges 
are rather insignificant and incorrectly signed for Malaysian bilateral trading. An 
attempt to correct current account imbalances by currency devaluation would thereby 
inappropriate. In addition, estimation of the trade balance models is more superior that 
complementary China effects are better captured for Malaysia trading with the 
advanced markets such as Australia, German, Japan, UK and the US. Such finding 
may partly due to the increase in global product fragmentation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic boom in Malaysia from the early 1990s until the onset of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis was underpinned by rapid export growth to developed markets, 
mainly the US, Japan and the EU core members. The export-lead policy has been 
quite successful and it has remained as growth impetus for Malaysia GDP in the 
recent decades. However, the rising of People Republic of China (PRC) as the world 
factory has raised a concern whether the export oriented growth policy will be 
sustainable. PRC has consistently achieved double-digit growth rates over the last two 
decades. Likewise, PRC’s export has targeted on developed markets especially the US 
and the EU, which is also among the main export destinations of Malaysia. Moreover, 
the export structure of PRC is quite similar with Malaysia as the base export of both 
countries is on labor-intensive manufacturing products. The accession of PRC into 
WTO in 2001 has further enhanced the magnitude of export flow from PRC to the 
developed markets. Since then PRC has become the largest final assembly base before 
consumer goods are exported to the developed nations. Most of the parts and 
components are shipped from Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and most likely will shrink 
the direct exports of Southeast countries, including Malaysia, to the developed nations. 
No doubt as a close neighbor of PRC, Malaysia export performance is under pressure.  
 
Table 1 provides some general statistics to support such argument. With the 
upward trending of export value over GDP, one can tell that both PRC and Malaysia 
were getting more reliance on exports. But unlike PRC that has experienced 
marvelous growth of exports after the 1990s; Malaysian exports grow at slower pace 
since mid-1990s. The figures decelerated in some of the years after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and during the 2008 Subprime crisis. In recent world export ranking, 
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PRC has been topped globally, while Malaysia is staying stagnant at the 20
th
 position. 
Looking at Table 2, both PRC and Malaysia share similar destination of export flows, 
with slightly different in the trade-partner ranking due to their dependency on the 
neighboring world level entrepots, i.e. Hong Kong and Singapore. Both countries also 
export relatively more to their neighboring countries, i.e. China to South Korea and 
Russia, while Malaysia to her ASEAN counterparts; but generally both countries 
export to the same developed markets, i.e. the US, Japan and the Western EU nations. 
Insert [Table 1, Table 2] about here 
 
Following the economy liberalization and recent trade expansion of China, the 
“PRC competitive threat” hypothesis has gained increasing attention among scholars. 
A few studies that focus on non-neighboring countries, namely the Latin American 
and Caribbean markets, have reported some significant PRC crowding-out effects (see 
for example, Quintin, 2004; Lall et al., 2005; Jenkins at al., 2006). Others, on the 
other hand, would suggest that PRC export expansion has a complementary effect for 
its neighbors. Frenald et al. (1999), for instance, reported that PRC export expansion 
as a result of Renmimbi devaluation in 1994 did not poses any crowding-out effect on 
NIEs (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) and ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, 
Thailand). Instead, PRC’s real export growth was positively correlated with real 
export growth of those countries. Eichenggreen et al. (2007) employed panel 
regression of 13 Asian countries (including Malaysia) with their 180 importing 
countries under an augmented gravity model also reported a positive effect of PRC 
export expansion. On top of that, they did find some extent of crowding-out effect 
when disaggregated data were used, mainly for less developed Asian economies and 
in consumer goods market which is considered as low-technology export; but not in 
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markets for capital goods, which is considered as high-technology export. Using a 
gravity approach, Greenaway et al. (2008) then documented empirical evidence that 
PRC export over 1997-2003 displaced total export of high income East Asia countries 
to third country, but for middle income East Asia countries, including Malaysia, PRC 
export expansion was actually complementary.  
 
Clearly, at present stage, the literature has not been conclusive about the “PRC 
competitive threat” and further exploration is to be taken. This study takes a different 
approach to investigate the issue pertaining to Malaysian bilateral trading with her 12 
major partners. First, we assess the impacts of PRC export expansion via two models: 
the Malaysian export model and the Malaysian trade balance model, by having China 
export as forcing variable. In other words, we examine if the China effect 
homogeneous across countries or varies by the export intensity and trade balances 
(export-import ratios). Such combined analysis is not yet to be occupied in the 
existing literature.
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Second, we use higher frequency monthly data (January 1990-June 2010) 
which allows us to capture the dynamic of bilateral trade flows and hence a more 
                                                 
1
 Most studies on Malaysia case employed the trade balance framework and none has assessed the 
China threat hypothesis. Yusoff (2007) found that the Malaysian trade balances are bounded by the real 
exchange rate, domestic and world incomes at aggregate level, and a delayed J-curve was supported. 
But in Yusoff (2009), Malaysia's bilateral trade balances are found to be responsive to the changes of 
the US and Singapore bilateral exchange rate but not the Japan case, and the J-curve only appeared for 
Malaysia-US. Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey (2010) then studied the Malaysia’s trade balances against 
14 trading partners during 1973Q1-2001Q3, but without assessing the China effect and did not cover 
the recent period of both dot com crisis and Subprime crisis, which have significant impacts on the 
demand for Malaysian exports. They reported inconclusive support of income effects and real 
exchange rate impacts on Malaysia trade balances. Moreover, out of 14 bilateral cases, the J-curve was 
only found for Malaysia versus Germany. Chan and Hooy (2012), on the other hand, directly examine 
the long run dynamics of exchange rate and bilateral export-import flows between China and Malaysia. 
Their finding reveals that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds in the long run but the export-import 
demands do not adhere to the J-curve pattern. Although the expansionary effect is of greater evidence 
for Malaysia due to real exchange shocks but inconclusive for China, they found some evidence that 
the China-Malaysia bilateral trading is along the sustainable path. 
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efficient estimation can be obtained. As the literature is mostly relying on annual or 
quarterly data, the estimation of China’s potential crowding-out effect could be 
relatively less efficient or not accurately captured. Our analysis generally shows 
insufficient evidence of China’s crowding-out effect on Malaysian export and 
bilateral trading. Instead, there are some empirical evidences that PRC’s export 
expansion gives a complementary effect on Malaysia’s trade with her major partners, 
by and large, due to the increase in global production networks of ASEAN5 with PRC 
over the last decade. 
 
In our study, the concern of structural break(s) is also taken into account. This 
is particularly important as our sample period covers a number of economics shocks 
and policy changes that may affect the structure of global trading (e.g. Asian financial 
crisis, China’s access to WTO and the Subprime crisis). Literature in recent years has 
also reached consensus that the disregard of structural changes leads to inefficient 
estimation and therefore lower testing power of univariate unit root tests (see Perron, 
1989; Lee and Strazicich, 2004; among others). Likewise, lack of careful investigation 
of potential structural breaks may also lead to misspecification of the long-run 
properties of a dynamical multivariate system and inadequate estimation and testing 
procedures, e.g. cointegration tests (Gregory et al., 1996; Gregory and Hansen, 1996; 
Esso, 2010). Thereby, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root break test proposed by 
Lee and Strazicich (2004) and the Gregory and Hansen (1996)’s cointegration test 
with break (GH) are utilized in our analyses. The LM unit root test tends to estimate 
the endogenous (unknown) break point correctly and is free of size distortions and 
spurious rejections in the presence of a unit root with break (Acaravci and Ozturk, 
2010). Meanwhile, the advantage of GH test lies on the ability to treat the issue of 
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endogenous break and cointegration altogether (Esso, 2010). The test procedure offers 
three models corresponding to three assumptions concerning the nature of shift in the 
cointegrating vector: the level shift model (C), the level shift with trend model (C/T), 
and the regime shift model (C/S). 
 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: in section 2, data and methodology 
are discussed; section 3 reports our empirical results and finally in section 4 we 
conclude. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Data 
Our study primarily focuses on the Malaysian top-15 trading partners. Since China 
has been chosen as forcing variable, Malaysia-China export is excluded from the 
dependent variable list. Malaysia-Hong Kong export is also dropped due to Hong 
Kong’s unique status as an entrepot for China. Malaysia-UAE is then excluded 
because the series is incomplete. Thus, in total, 12 trading partners are covered in this 
study, which are Australia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Netherland, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. 
Monthly data spanning from January 1990 to June 2010 are utilized in our analysis 
with the exception of Australia (quarterly data). Data used in this study include 
Malaysian exports to her top-12 trading markets, Chinese exports to the same 
destinations, industrial production indexes of the twelve trading partners, and bilateral 
real exchange rates that compiled from bilateral nominal exchange rate and consumer 
price index. All data are extracted from DataStream and IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS), and transformed into logarithmic scale prior to the analysis. Due to 
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data unavailability, the analysis period varies for some countries. The two EU 
countries, i.e. Germany and Netherlands start from January 1999, India starts from 
April 1994, Korea starts from January 1991 and the Philippines start from January 
1996.  
 
2.2 Empirical Model 
A simple demand function of Malaysian export is given as follow: 
 iii RERYfMALEX ,
*        (1) 
 
iiii RERYYfMALTB ,,
*        (2) 
 
Equation (1) states that Malaysian export to a foreign country i, (
iMALEX ) is 
dependent on the income level of the trading partner *iY  (e.g. China) and the relative 
real prices of the two currencies, i.e. the real exchange rate,
iRER . Whereas equation 
(2) highlights the conventional theory that Malaysian trade balances ( iMALTB ) will 
be affected by both the domestic and foreign incomes as well as real exchange rates. 
The formula below is employed to compute the real exchange rate (RER) between 
Ringgit Malaysia and a foreign currency: 
M
i
i
i
CPI
CPI
x
ER
RM
RER  
 
where RM is Ringgit Malaysia, ERi is the currency of foreign country i, CPI i and CPI 
M are the consumer price index of country i and Malaysia, respectively. To address the 
PRC effect on Malaysian export demand, we consider the augmented version of 
model (1) and (2), which given by the following specifications: 
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ttitititi CHNEXRERIPMALEX ,3,2
*
,1, lnlnlnln       (3) 
ttititititi CHNEXRERIPIPMALTB ,4,3
*
,2,1, lnlnlnlnln  (4)                 
 
where lnMALEXi and lnMALTBi are the natural logarithmic of Malaysian exports to 
foreign country i and trade balance with country i respectively. The trade balance is 
usually defined as the bilateral export-import ratio. lnRERi is the natural logarithmic 
of real exchange rate between Ringgit Malaysia and the currency of country i, lnIPi 
and lnIPi
*
 are the respective natural logarithmic of domestic and foreign industrial 
production as proxy for the domestic (Malaysia) and foreign income of trading partner, 
and εt as error term. For model (3), we expect 1  > 0 and 2 > 0 since an increase in 
foreign income would lead to an increase demand for Malaysian exports, whereas real 
Malaysian ringgit depreciation (RER positive) is also expected to increase Malaysian 
exports. For model (4), similar justification is applied. When Malaysian income rises, 
domestic imports will increase and hence trade balance deteriorates. If Malaysian 
ringgit depreciates, trade balance will improve due to cheaper but better-demanded 
exports and declined imports which are more expensive. Such situation will occur 
only if Marshall-Lerner condition is met. So, we expect 1 < 0, 2 > 0, 3 > 0. 
 
 
Unlike the existing literature, our study incorporates an additional factor, 
lnCHNEXi (China’s export to the same destination market) to capture the potential 
long run crowding-out effect of China export expansion. If the Chinese exports 
exhibit substituting effect on Malaysian exports to the same destination, 
3  or 4 will 
report a negative sign. This implies that the more Chinese goods are exported, the 
lesser the demand for Malaysian exports in the similar markets. Otherwise, 3  or 4
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will display a positive sign to imply complementary effect. The above setting allows 
us to establish and examine the China crowding-out hypothesis. 
 
2.3 Unit root tests 
Following the standard practice for time series analysis; we begin our empirical 
evaluation by examining the stationary properties of all variables concerned. Many of 
the existing studies used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) or Phillips-Perron (PP) 
unit root test to ascertain the order of integration of the series. A problem with these 
tests is neither allows for the possibility of a structural break. Perron (1989) showed 
that the power to reject a unit root decreases when the stationary alternative is true 
and a structural break is ignored. In other words, the failure to allow for potential 
break leads to a bias that reduces the ability to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. 
We employ the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test with one structural break 
proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2004). LM unit root test with one structural break 
has the major advantage that it is unaffected by the existence of a structural break 
under the null (see Lee and Strazicich, 2001). The LM unit root test can be explained 
using the following data generating process: 
t t ty Z e , 1t t te e       (5) 
 
where tZ  consists of exogenous variables and t is an error term with classical 
properties. Model A which is also known as the “crash” model, allows for a one-time 
change in the intercept under the alternative hypothesis. Model A can be described by
'
1, ,t tZ t D , where 1tD  for 1,Bt T  and zero otherwise; TB is the date of the 
structural break, and δ' = (δ1, δ2, δ3). The LM unit root test statistic is obtained from 
the following regression: 
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tttt SZy 1       (6) 
 
where ttxtt
ˆZˆyS , T,...,t 2 ; ˆ  are coefficients in the regression of ty on 
tZ ; xˆ  is given by tt Zy ; and 1y  and 1Z  represent the first observations of ty  
and tZ  respectively. The LM test statistic, is given by t-statistic for testing the unit 
root null hypothesis that 0 . The location of the structural break BT  is 
determined by selecting all possible break points for the minimum t-statistic as 
follows: 
iinf inf , where TTB .    (7) 
 
The search is carried out over the trimming region (0.1T, 0.9T), where T is 
sample size. To select the lag length, we used the general to specific procedure 
proposed by Hall (1994). We set the maximum number of lags equal to 12 and used 
the 10% asymptotic normal value of 1.645 to ascertain the statistical significance of 
the last first-differenced lagged term. After deciding the optimal lag length for each 
breakpoint, we determine the break where the endogenous LM t-test statistic is at a 
minimum. Critical values for the LM unit root test with one structural break are 
tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2004). 
 
2.4 Cointegration test 
Once the order of integration of each variable is ascertained, we test for cointegration 
for the long-run relationship between Malaysian exports to country i with the 
respective independent variables as stated in equation (3) and (4). Gregory and 
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Hansen (1996) proposed three models for testing cointegration where the existence of 
a structural break in the cointegrating vector is allowed. 
Model C: , t = 1, …, n    (8) 
Model C/T: , 1,...,t n    (9) 
Model C/S:  , 1,...,t n   (10) 
 
Model C contains a level shift, Model C/T contains level shift and trend, and 
Model C/S allows for regime shift. Then, 0tD  for t  and 1tD  for t . Xt  
can be referring to the matrix of all related dependent variables and β’ is the vector of 
estimated coefficients. Here, β’ denotes the cointegrating slope coefficients before the 
regime shift and γ’ denotes the change in the slope coefficients. In order to test for 
cointegration between dependent and independent variables with structural change, i.e. 
the stationarity of 
tu  in Equations (8) – (10), Gregory and Hansen (1996) proposed a 
suite of tests. These statistics are the commonly used ADF statistics and extensions of 
the Z
 
and 
tZ  test statistics proposed by Phillips (1987), which defined as: 
* inf
T
ADF ADF        (11) 
* inf
T
Z Z        (12) 
* inft t
T
Z Z        (13) 
 
As the break point, , is unknown a priori, the model is estimated recursively 
allowing the break point to vary between (0.1T, 0.9T), where T is the sample size. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is examined using the three statistics with 
interest in the smallest values for the three statistics across all break points required to 
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reject the null. As robustness test, we also perform the Johansen-Juselius (1990) 
cointegration test based on the following vector autoregressive (VAR) specifications:  
        (14) 
and 
     (15) 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Unit Root and Breaks 
The LM unit root test with break generally supports that all variables in each of the 
countries are integrated of order one at the 5 per cent level or better except the 
Malaysian export to Australia.
2
 Basically not all the series has structural break and the 
significant break for different variables of a country is also differ. We do not intend to 
examine the detail of the break points for all the series but some discussion on the 
break points of export series is relevant to our research focus.  
 
We note that the location of the significant breaks for Malaysian export series 
took place mainly around the period of 1997 Asian financial crisis, while the Chinese 
export series have many breaks surrounding 1992/93. For Malaysia, the break for 
export to her two largest ASEAN members, i.e. Singapore and Thailand was 
happened after the implementation of capital control and Ringgit pegging in 
                                                 
2
 We find that For Malaysian export, the break in the intercept is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level or better in eight out of the twelve countries. For Chinese export, the break in the intercept is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level or better in seven out of the twelve countries. Australia, 
Indonesia and Netherland are the three that do not have any significant break in the intercept for both 
exports from Malaysia and China. Details of the unit root tests are available upon request. 
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September 1998. The break for South Korea, the Philippines and India was happened 
before the outbreak of the crisis in July 1997 while the break for Germany occurred in 
November 2005, exactly the month when Malaysia ended her Ringgit pegging regime. 
For Japan, the break was in 2008, the transition period which China came close to 
replace Japan as Malaysia’s third largest export destination since the last two 
decades.
3 
 
 
Malaysian export to US has a break as early as in 1992. This break was 
happened when Malaysia’s electronic and electrical (E&E) export, which accounted 
for nearly 40% of her total manufactured export, had been shifted to Singapore in 
1992. The export share of electronic and components to US for example, which 
accounted for nearly 50% of Malaysian E&E export since the mid-1980, has dropped 
to 30% in 1992. On the other hand, many of the breaks in 1992 and 1993 that have 
been detected for China’s export were mainly due to its major economic 
transformation which started in 1992. The break for Chinese export to the Philippines 
was happened in 1997 due by large to the devaluation of Peso in July.  
 
3.2 Long run Estimates 
Given that all variables are I(1) for each of the countries we proceed to test for 
cointegration with a structural break in the cointegration vector using the Gregory and 
Hansen (1996) test. The results are presented in Table 3a and Table 3b respectively. 
In general, we find cointegration relationship for export model and trade balance 
model between variables studied in each of the 12 countries. Even though the null 
                                                 
3
 In fact, based on the monthly export data from IMF DOTS, in 2008, China export value was higher 
than Japan from April to September, except June. After March 2009, Malaysia export to China has 
surpassed those to Japan and the US and since August 2009 the value has come close to Singapore 
which has been the largest destination of Malaysian export since the drop in Malaysian export to the 
US in October 2007. 
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hypothesis of no cointegration is not able to be rejected with the ADF* statistic for all 
three export models in India, Singapore and UK (see Table 3a), both Zt and Zα 
statistics show strong evidence of significant at 1 per cent level for all three models in 
all countries. Hence, we conclude that there exists long-run relationship between 
Malaysia’s export and real exchange rate, economic growth and China’s export in all 
twelve countries. If we refer to Table 3b for trade balance models, similar justification 
is applied to the Malaysia-UK case. For other 11 trade balance cases, hypothesis of no 
cointegration is highly rejected and long run relationships among the variables are 
confirmed.  
Insert [Table 3a, Table 3b] about here 
 
There are a range of break points across the test statistics for export models. In 
general the break in Australia, Japan, and the EU countries occurs in 2001/02 
coincides with China’s accession into WTO. Only for Singapore the break was 
happened during the Asian financial crisis. Indonesia and Thailand have a break in 
1993/94. The break for Korea was in 2006 while for the Philippines it was in 1999. 
The break date of the US was in the mid of 1996 and India showed a divert break 
across models. As for the trade balance models, break dates happen mostly during the 
1997/98 Asia crisis and the 2001dot com bubble. The break date of 2008 Subprime 
crisis was detected only for the Malaysia-Philippines case. 
 
The unreported results of Johansen cointegration test also show at least one 
cointegrating equation is found in all countries infers that there exists long-run 
relationship between the variables. Hence, we are confident to examine the long-run 
relationship between Malaysian export and Chinese export. The normalization results 
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from cointegration test with lnMALEX as the dependent variable or in other words 
the long-run elasticities of Malaysian exports with respect to other variables are 
reported in Table 4a. We find that China’s export positively affects the export of 
Malaysia to five of her major trading partners including India, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Philippines, and the UK. China’s export posits a significant negative impact only on 
Malaysian export to Singapore. Yet, Australia, Germany, Korea, Netherland, Thailand 
and the US do not show any significant impact due to Chinese exports. Except for 
Singapore and India, the significant coefficients of China effect (CHNEX) are 
generally less elastic, ranging from 0.1716 to 0.8553.  
 
If we refer back to Table 2, the sum of total exports to these nations (excluding 
Japan) are less than 9% of Malaysian total exports over 2000-2010, which mainly 
consist of refined petroleum, palm oil, iron & steel products. These long run positive 
effects may be offset by the negative effects on exports to Singapore (15% of 
Malaysian exports, 2000-2010), which are mainly electrical and electronic products. 
But since Singapore is an entreport that provide best springboard for Malaysian 
exporters to venture abroad, it is still early to conclude if Malaysian export could 
suffer from China’s treat in the high-tech and low-tech manufacturing exports as 
highlighted by Haltmaier et al. (2007). At the same time, it is worth noting that the 
long run results have not provided sufficient support to  Walmsley and Hertel (2000) 
who claimed that China's competitors in the labor-intensive apparel industry would 
experience significant losses in real income, partly due to declining terms of trade. 
Insert [Table 4a] about here 
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On the other hand, the impact of real exchange rates and demand side effect 
owing to income changes (proxy by industrial production) has been rather mixed. 
Exports are responding negatively to the depreciation of the US, Singapore and the 
Philippines real exchange rates (RER negative = ringgit appreciates) but responding 
positively against the depreciation of real Indian Rupee, Indonesian Rupiah and 
Korean Won (RER positive = ringgit depreciates). Such mixed result has been 
reported by Baharumshah (2001), Bahmani-Oskooee and Wang (2006) and Ahmad 
and Yang (2007), who found limited support of positive long-run effect of foreign 
exchange on trade.  
 
 As for the income effects (demand side) in long run, Malaysia exports are 
mostly affected by production growth (as proxy of income) in the trading partner  
except for the Philippines, Korea and UK. Demand for Malaysian export rises when 
production expands at Australia, Germany, Netherland, Singapore, Thailand and the 
US. Otherwise, exports respond negatively to production growth at India, Indonesia 
and Japan. The effect varies among trading partners may be due to the production and 
export diversification. Together, nations that show positive income effects have 
accounted for about half of the total Malaysian exports during 2000-2010 and, most of 
the Malaysian exports to these developed nations (except Thailand) comprise of 
medium- and high-tech manufacturing exports. Such finding is in line with 
Eichengreen et al. (2004, 2007) that Chinese export growth is likely to have negative 
consequences for relatively less technologically advanced consumer goods-exporting 
Asian countries, but positive consequences for exporters of more sophisticated capital 
goods. As for the Japan case, two states of affairs are of concern. First, the Japanese 
economic downturn in 1990s and sluggish recovery in the 2000s; second, duty-free 
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goods constituted 86% of Japan’s imports from Malaysia (including duty-free 
treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)) and 67% of 
Malaysia’s imports from Japan during 1990s-2000s (see Japan-Malaysia Economic 
Partnership, 2003). Together, both scenarios fail to provide positive momentum on 
Japanese income-demand for Malaysian exports. However, to verify the details of 
such inconsistent effects among the trading partners, we have to estimate thoroughly 
at micro-level, which at present stage is beyond the scope of present paper. 
 
 Unlike the export models, the long run estimates of trade balance models are 
more consistent and straightforward (see Table 4b). Nine out of twelve cases, the 
domestic income coefficients have been significant with expected negative sign. 
Malaysian incomes are reported insignificant only for the India, Indonesia and 
Netherland cases. As for the foreign income variables, all coefficients are positive of 
which only three cases are insignificant (Germany, India and Netherland). Such 
finding is consistent with those predicted by economic theory where income and 
purchasing power have been the main determining factor of exports and imports. So, 
as far as domestic and foreign incomes are concerned, the Malaysian bilateral trading 
with major partners are demand-driven. But when we assess the real exchange rate 
effect on trade balance, the inconsistency remains. Half of the coefficients are 
reported significant with only five carry the expected negative sign. Such result does 
not allow the Malaysian authority to count on devaluation as tool of current account 
correction. On the other hand, Table 4b also shows that the China’s exports have 
exhibited complementary effects to Malaysian trading in the long-run, mainly for 
advanced export destinations such as Australia, Germany, Japan, UK and the US. 
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Substituting effects are only reported for the Malaysia-Singapore and Malaysia-Korea 
cases. 
Insert [Table 4b] about here 
 
 
3.3 Short run Estimates and Adjustments 
One needs to be careful when interpreting the consistency of long- and short-run 
results of China effect. For export models, only India and UK reported positive and 
significant Chinese effect in both long-run and short-run, the coefficients of the rest 
are different (see Table 5a). Occurrence of such inconsistency is possibly owing to the 
various market and policy responses in short-run due to the series of global and 
regional economic shocks during 1990-2000s, which include the 1997/98 Asia 
financial crisis, 2001 IT bubble, 2008 subprime crisis, as well as global food and 
crude oil shocks, etc. But overall, the short run dynamics are fairly consistent with 
long run estimates that the crowding out effect is light. Only two trading partners have 
reported competing role (negative effect) while six others have reported significant 
complementary role (positive effect) of Chinese exports (see Table 5a). In addition, 
the coefficients of DCHEX range from 0.0733 to -0.4022, suggesting a much possible 
scenario that China effect could be over-projected in the literature. As for the trade 
balance model reported in Table 5b, Australia and Japan have shown complementary 
China effects in the short run, Indonesia has shown substituting effect while the rest 
are insignificant. Until this point, it seems like complementary China effect has been 
favoring the Malaysian trading in the advanced markets rather than her ASEAN 
neighboring nations.  
Insert [Table 5a, Table 5b] about here 
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Quite surprising, however, the exchange rate effect almost disappears in the 
short run except for Malaysia-US (export model-Table 5a) and Malaysia-Australia 
(trade balance model-Table 5b). Such finding is supported by Rose and Yellen (1989) 
who rejected the exchange rate-trade nexus among US-G7. Then, the income effects 
are also trivial in short run and only found significant in the US, Singapore, Germany 
and India with smaller coefficients. In the trade balance model, only Thailand and the 
US cases have shown significant domestic income, but the coefficients are positive 
(unexpected) in the short run and negative (expected) in the long run. A possible 
explanation provided by Yusoff (2007) is that the rise in domestic income is due to 
the increase in the production of importables and exportables through the utilisation of 
the imported capital and intermediate goods. The importing of these goods worsens 
the trade balance in the short run but it helps improve the trade balance in the long run 
as investment and intermediate goods support the manufacture of domestic 
exportables and importables.  
 
In addition, ten, out of twelve cases in the export models (Table 5a) have 
shown negative and significant error correction terms (ECT) except for Germany, and 
Netherland. Of all, Indonesia and Australia reported higher coefficients of ECT at -
0.8548 and -0.6793 respectively. This would imply greater and faster adjustments in 
the Malaysia-Indonesia and Malaysia-Australia export markets towards long run 
equilibrium, once being shocked. As for the trade balance models, all major trading 
partners have reported negative and significant ECT, ranging from -0.0229 to -0.9020. 
All in all, the results show that the trade balance model is superior to the export model 
in terms of consistency, short run adjustments and the China effects evidence. 
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3.4 Further Discussion 
Our analysis that based on the export models and trade balance models have so far 
shows general supports of the complementary China effects, and, in some cases, some 
substituting effects. Yet, our empirical evidence reveals that the fear for China effect 
might be over-projected. The complementary effect of PRC exports expansion could 
be explained by the increase in global production networks or so called product 
fragmentation in the global export sector. With the accession into WTO in 2001, PRC 
enterprises are now more specializing and in coordination with her regional 
counterparts and this has results in raising intra-industry trade in differentiated 
products in the region. On this ground, Lall and Albaladejo (2004) have conducted a 
lengthy examination on export flows of PRC and East Asia manufacturing sector in 
the 1990s and highlights that the new Tigers (mainly Southeast Asia markets, 
including Malaysia) facing PRC treat in low technology manufacturing exports in 
third markets, but not in medium and high-technology manufacturing.  
 
In a more recent study, Haltmaier et al. (2007) found that PRC export threat on 
East Asia countries was more pronounced in the medium technology manufacturing 
rather than the low technology sector, but their individual result on Malaysia revealed 
that PRC threat is felt at both extreme of in high-tech and low tech manufacturing 
exports. This finding seems to suggest that PRC may have moved up the ladder chain 
from low-technology export to medium technology export as predicted by Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004), and soon PRC might as well dominate the high-technology export 
in the near future. Nevertheless, Athukorala (2009), again, pointed out that such 
worries might be over-projected. Though PRC has experienced rapid increase in high-
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technology exports over 1992-2006, the focus was on the bulk of labor-intensive 
high-technology product at the expense of the more high-wage East Asia NIEs, but 
not on the ASEAN (including Malaysia). The fact is being supported when product 
fragmentation is accounted (the component trade is netted out). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper addresses the crowding-out effect of People Republic of China (PRC) on 
Malaysian exports and trade balances over the period of 1990-2010 with monthly 
trade series. We employ unit root and cointegration tests with break to encounter the 
problem of structural changes in time series. The corresponding long run elasticities 
and short-run dynamics of the related variables are being examined. While the income 
effects are more apparent in most cases, the real exchange rates are rather 
insignificant and incorrectly signed for Malaysian bilateral trading. Such finding does 
not favor the practice of ringgit devaluation as tool of current account correction. In 
addition, estimation of the trade balance model is generally more consistent that the 
China’s exports have exhibited complementary effects in the long-run, mainly for 
advanced export destinations such as Australia, Germany, Japan, UK and the US.  
 
Our finding that China’s export expansion has been complementary for 
emerging market like Malaysia is consistent with other empirical literature using 
panel regression via gravity modeling by Frenald et al. (1999), Eichenggreen et al. 
(2007) and Greenaway et al. (2008). Such positive effect could be due to the increase 
in global production networks in the export sector over the last decade. As observed 
by Athukorala (2009), the production fragmentation in East Asia region which pushes 
PRC’s fast export expansion happens at the expenses of the more high-wage East 
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Asia NIEs, but not on the medium-wage ASEAN countries, including Malaysia. Our 
result is consistent with the literature looking at the component trade data. Future 
research might want to look into the various different technology level of the 
component trade in the East Asia region to gauge a more complete picture of the 
China effects on Malaysia in specific, and on East Asia and other emerging markets in 
general.  
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Table 1: GDP, Export Performance and Export Structure of PRC and Malaysia, 1990-2010 
 
Aggregate 
GDP 
(in billion USD) 
Average 
GDP Growth 
(% Growth) 
Aggregate 
Export 
(in billion USD) 
Average Export 
Growth 
(%) 
Export/GDP 
(%) 
Average 
World 
Export Rank 
Year China Mal China Mal China Mal China Mal China Mal China Mal 
             
1990-1995 2886.80 382.52 10.87 9.40 581.89 284.15 143.98 153.32 20.16 74.28 11 20 
1996-2000 5109.95 446.13 8.62 4.99 962.01 413.31 98.39 74.55 18.83 92.64 9 20 
2001-2005 8608.14 566.43 9.76 4.76 2387.41 554.06 148.17 34.05 27.73 97.82 4 18 
2005-2010* 15714.29 758.09 11.40 3.83 6401.56 924.93 168.14 66.94 30.68 122.01 1 19 
             Source: GDP and GDP growth are obtained from World Bank, available only for 1990-2009 only. Total export value is 
obtained from IMF for the full sample 1990-2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Top 15 Export Destination of Malaysia and China, 2000-2010 
Malaysia Percentage China Percentage 
Aggregate for Top-15 83.02% Aggregate for Top-15  73.70% 
1. US  15.98% 1. US  19.39% 
2. Singapore 15.25% 2. Hong Kong  15.12% 
3. Japan 10.12% 3. Japan  9.74% 
4. China  9.33% 4. South Korea  4.64% 
5. Hong Kong  5.00% 5. Germany  4.10% 
6. Thailand  4.69% 6. Netherland  3.16% 
7. Netherland  3.56% 7. UK  2.52% 
8. South Korea  3.50% 8. Singapore  2.26% 
9. Australia  3.16% 9. India  1.83% 
10. India  2.77% 10. Russia  1.78% 
11. Indonesia  2.64% 11. Italy  1.72% 
12. Germany  2.31% 12. France  1.64% 
13. UK  1.93% 13. Australia  1.54% 
14. UAE  1.40% 14. Canada  1.47% 
15. Philippine  1.38% 15. Malaysia  1.46% 
Source: Authors’ calculation from export series obtained from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
Note: Ranking based on cumulative export value to the destination country over Malaysia total world 
export value over 2000-2010. 
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Table 3a: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test for Malaysian Exports with Structural Break 
ttitititi CHNEXRERIPMALEX ,3,2
*
,1, lnlnlnln  
Export 
Destination 
Model ADF
*
 k TB Z
*
t TB Z
*
α TB 
Australia C -8.6995
***
 1 95Q1 -9.3154
***
 01Q4 -85.6076
***
 01Q4 
 
C/T -9.0772
***
 1 01Q3 -9.1338
***
 01Q3 -83.2079
***
 00Q4 
 
C/S -9.4947
***
 1 01Q3 -9.5538
***
 01Q3 -87.3196
**
 01Q3 
Germany C -5.3712 1 01M03 -7.7507
***
 01M04 -79.8263
***
 01M04 
 
C/T -8.7066
***
 0 01M01 -8.7102
***
 01M01 -97.1322
***
 01M01 
 
C/S -5.2836 1 01M03 -7.6766
***
 01M04 -79.4323
**
 01M04 
India C -5.2508 1 96M08 -8.3886
***
 96M08 -95.9239
***
 98M01 
 
C/T -5.1539 1 96M08 -8.7776
***
 00M12 -105.8628
***
 00M12 
 
C/S -5.9370 1 02M11 -9.4016
***
 96M08 -115.5300
***
 96M08 
Indonesia C -15.3306
***
 1 93M06 -15.3620
***
 93M06 -241.4436
***
 93M06 
 
C/T -14.5691
***
 1 94M02 -14.5989
***
 94M02 -228.7284
***
 94M02 
 
C/S -15.9640
***
 1 94M01 -15.9967
***
 94M01 -251.3175
***
 94M01 
Japan C -6.6042
***
 1 01M10 -9.9644
***
 01M07 -133.7110
***
 01M07 
 
C/T -5.4320 1 01M09 -8.0576
***
 01M09 -97.3705
***
 01M09 
 
C/S -6.8375
**
 1 02M05 -10.1128
***
 02M02 -136.9334
***
 02M02 
Korea C -6.6018
***
 1 98M02 -9.4014
***
 98M01 -124.5105
***
 98M01 
 
C/T -9.9739
***
 0 05M10 -9.9661
***
 06M11 -137.0850
***
 06M11 
 
C/S -6.9435
***
 1 06M08 -9.7242
***
 06M09 -131.7691
***
 06M09 
Netherland C -7.6234
***
 1 02M01 -7.8691
***
 02M02 -79.1751
***
 02M02 
 
C/T -7.6936
***
 1 02M01 -8.0054
***
 02M04 -80.2651
***
 02M04 
 
C/S -9.0500
***
 0 02M02 -9.0655
***
 02M02 -104.3059
***
 02M02 
Philippines C -6.6053
***
 1 99M09 -10.8624
***
 99M10 -139.0569
***
 99M10 
 
C/T -6.9896
***
 1 99M09 -11.2436
***
 99M10 -145.6857
***
 99M10 
 
C/S -6.5938
**
 1 99M09 -10.8318
***
 99M10 -138.5970
***
 99M10 
Singapore C -4.8041 2 98M02 -8.5638
***
 97M09 -105.3971
***
 97M09 
 
C/T -5.1099 2 98M02 -8.1316
***
 97M09 -98.2672
***
 97M09 
 
C/S -5.0339 2 98M01 -10.0971
***
 98M08 -136.6588
***
 98M08 
Thailand C -9.1521
***
 1 94M04 -9.0300
***
 93M01 -119.6389
***
 94M04 
 
C/T -9.7516
***
 1 94M04 -9.6785
***
 94M04 -134.7503
***
 94M05 
 
C/S -10.3537
***
 0 99M10 -10.6839
***
 97M03 -157.0362
***
 97M03 
UK C -5.5305 1 00M07 -8.1166
***
 01M01 -95.4046
***
 01M01 
 
C/T -5.5238 1 00M07 -8.1149
***
 01M01 -95.4698
***
 01M03 
 
C/S -5.4565 1 01M02 -8.6275
***
 01M01 -109.5692
***
 01M01 
US C -5.7900
**
 1 06M11 -8.9960
***
 07M02 -115.8472
***
 07M02 
 
C/T -5.5206 1 94M03 -10.3849
***
 96M06 -143.7848
***
 96M06 
 
C/S -6.9039
**
 1 96M07 -10.6585
***
 96M06 -147.9528
***
 96M07 
Note: TB is the endogenous structural break date detected. (
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (5)(1)% level.  
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Table 3b: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test for Malaysian Trade Balance with Structural Break 
ttititititi CHNEXRERIPIPMALTB ,4,3
*
,2,1, lnlnlnlnln  
Export 
Destination 
Model ADF* k TB Z*t TB Z
*
α TB 
Australia C -6.7879*** 1 98Q1 -6.8074*** 98Q1 -59.0977* 98Q1 
 
C/T -6.7992*** 1 98Q1 -6.8185*** 98Q1 -59.1665 98Q1 
 
C/S -6.9066** 1 98Q1 -6.9355*** 98Q1 -61.0612 98Q1 
Germany C -7.3159*** 1 01M02 -7.3428*** 01M02 -79.1147*** 01M02 
 
C/T -7.9323*** 1 00M11 -7.9734*** 00M11 -89.4992*** 00M11 
 
C/S 7.6190*** 1 03M09 -7.6470*** 03M09 -82.7644** 03M09 
India C -5.4358* 2 07M07 -9.0887*** 98M01 -110.0264*** 98M01 
 
C/T -5.3468* 2 05M03 -9.9740*** 00M03 -125.3496*** 00M03 
 
C/S -5.5930 2 07M08 -11.5235*** 98M01 -149.6438*** 98M01 
Indonesia C -13.7729*** 1 97M11 -13.8010*** 97M11 -213.9372*** 97M11 
 
C/T -13.9187*** 1 06M07 -13.9472*** 06M07 -216.9057*** 06M07 
 
C/S -14.0428*** 1 06M09 -14.0716*** 06M09 -217.2996*** 06M09 
Japan C -5.9366** 2 98M04 -8.2302*** 98M01 -99.7886*** 98M01 
 
C/T -6.3949*** 1 96M01 -9.0175*** 98M01 -113.7005*** 98M01 
 
C/S -10.6811*** 0 98M03 -11.1785*** 97M11 -160.6966*** 97M11 
Korea C 6.8900*** 1 99M09 -10.1038*** 99M09 -138.2137*** 99M09 
 
C/T -6.9273*** 1 94M06 -10.0899*** 99M09 -137.9048*** 99M09 
 
C/S -10.2777*** 0 96M04 -10.4329*** 03M11 -145.9609*** 95M02 
Netherland C -9.8288*** 1 00M12 -9.8567*** 00M12 -112.9410*** 00M12 
 
C/T 10.6066*** 1 06M03 -10.6455*** 06M03 -123.8638*** 06M03 
 
C/S 10.2656*** 1 02M02 -10.3033*** 02M02 -120.8414*** 02M02 
Philippines C -5.1772 1 08M02 -7.2183*** 08M04 -78.6622*** 08M04 
 
C/T -8.3077*** 0 08M02 -8.9995*** 08M04 -109.2797*** 08M04 
 
C/S -9.2069*** 0 03M09 -9.2336*** 03M09 -118.5298*** 03M09 
Singapore C -6.8410*** 2 01M04 -14.2996*** 01M08 -225.1693*** 01M08 
 
C/T -6.7799*** 2 01M08 -14.2438*** 96M03 -224.3024*** 96M03 
 
C/S -7.0358*** 2 01M09 -14.4494*** 93M05 -227.6889*** 93M05 
Thailand C -10.2830*** 0 96M02 -10.5565*** 96M05 -151.1832*** 96M05 
 
C/T -10.2253*** 0 96M02 -10.4627*** 96M05 -149.3784*** 96M05 
 
C/S -7.7514*** 1 96M02 -10.7392*** 96M03 -155.4267*** 96M03 
UK C -4.5056 2 93M01 -7.8966*** 01M01 -93.4370*** 01M01 
 
C/T -4.5113 2 93M01 -8.1242*** 97M11 -97.1811*** 97M11 
 
C/S -5.7304 2 93M06 -10.6807*** 01M01 -154.2188*** 01M01 
US C -11.0158*** 1 96M10 -11.0383*** 96M10 -163.0471*** 96M10 
 
C/T -11.8577*** 1 98M06 -11.8820*** 98M06 -179.0699*** 98M06 
 
C/S -12.8058*** 1 98M06 -12.8321*** 98M06 -196.3106*** 98M06 
Note: TB is the endogenous structural break date detected. (
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (5)(1)% level.  
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Table 4a: Long-run Estimates of Malaysian Exports 
Export  
Destination 
Independent Variables 
Constant IP RER CHNEX 
Australia 
-10.1160
***
 
(-1.8279) 
2.8229
***
 
(0.4597) 
0.4932 
(0.1976) 
0.3980 
(0.0530) 
Germany 
-10.6293
***
 
(2.3405) 
3.4525
***
 
(0.5923) 
0.2446 
(0.4522) 
-0.0088 
(0.1115) 
India 
15.1610
***
 
(4.6861) 
-4.5575
***
 
(1.6016) 
1.8385
***
 
(0.6718) 
1.3050
***
 
(0.2946) 
Indonesia 
12.5963
**
 
(5.0515) 
-2.3549
*
 
(1.2686) 
1.5311
**
 
(0.7553) 
0.8553
***
 
(0.1716) 
Japan 
13.1281
***
 
(3.3701) 
-2.1237
***
 
(0.7245) 
0.0014 
(0.3672) 
0.4352
***
 
(0.0489) 
Korea 
12.7946
**
 
(5.8443) 
0.1979 
(0.9696) 
1.8625
**
 
(0.8836) 
0.3228 
(0.3711) 
Netherland 
-9.3503 
(6.1649) 
3.1317
**
 
(1.4619) 
0.5252 
(0.5652) 
0.0717 
(0.1626) 
Philippines 
4.5421 
(7.2524) 
-1.3120 
(1.5418) 
-1.8461
***
 
(0.6896) 
0.3153
*
 
(0.1854) 
Singapore 
-5.7792
***
 
(2.0064) 
7.3040
***
 
(1.2380) 
-7.1718
***
 
(1.6688) 
-1.7426
***
 
(0.3879) 
Thailand 
-8.1743
**
 
(3.8572) 
3.7228
***
 
(1.1581) 
-0.4105 
(1.5046) 
-0.7299 
(0.4556) 
UK 
7.2839
**
 
(2.9245) 
-0.6315 
(0.6688) 
0.0393 
(0.1668) 
0.1716
***
 
(0.0303) 
US 
-5.9703
***
 
(2.1000) 
3.0312
***
 
(0.6420) 
-0.6824
**
 
(0.3293) 
0.0526 
(0.0679) 
Notes: (
*
)(
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (10)(5)(1)% level respectively. Reported in 
parentheses are standard errors. IP – Industrial Production, RER – bilateral real exchange rate, 
CHNEX – Chinese exports to Malaysian Trading Partners. 
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Table 4b: Long-run Estimates of Malaysian Trade Balance 
Export 
Destination 
Independent Variables 
Constant IP IP* RER CHNEX 
Australia 
-4.0460*** 
(1.5651) 
-1.2483*** 
(0.3078) 
1.7687*** 
(0.3696) 
0.1067 
(0.1927) 
0.2793*** 
(0.0907) 
Germany 
0.1413 
(1.0925) 
-0.5991*** 
(0.1947) 
0.1659 
(0.2667) 
0.4061*** 
(0.0985) 
0.1908** 
(0.0778) 
India 
-12.2228*** 
(3.7152) 
1.0778 
(0.7318) 
1.1738 
(0.7709) 
1.2588 
(0.9608) 
-0.2758 
(0.1848) 
Indonesia 
-3.2234* 
(1.5012) 
0.0062 
(0.2235) 
0.3302* 
(0.1833) 
0.2468*** 
(0.0802) 
-0.0475 
(0.0654) 
Japan 
-11.6637*** 
(2.7934) 
-4.0287*** 
(0.5120) 
3.7451*** 
(0.5040) 
-0.1690 
(0.3470) 
1.5831*** 
(0.2165) 
Korea 
3.2657** 
(1.4314) 
-2.5386*** 
(0.3908) 
2.9473*** 
(0.3608) 
-0.4223* 
(0.2198) 
-0.3097*** 
(0.0392) 
Netherland 
-3.2918* 
(1.8541) 
0.3838 
(0.3677) 
0.4308 
(0.4928) 
0.5125*** 
(0.1183) 
0.1871 
(0.1163) 
Philippines 
-28.8298*** 
(7.4304) 
-1.4676* 
(0.8124) 
5.3220*** 
(0.7663) 
1.7701*** 
(0.3768) 
0.8151*** 
(0.2382) 
Singapore 
-0.3120 
(0.7823) 
-0.4754*** 
(0.1035) 
0.5579*** 
(0.1222) 
-0.0552 
(0.0809) 
-0.0612** 
(0.0289) 
Thailand 
0.9948** 
(0.4721) 
-0.5168*** 
(0.1707) 
0.3839** 
(0.1731) 
-0.0803 
(0.1424) 
-0.0249 
(0.0595) 
UK 
-12.0537*** 
(1.8715) 
-0.7729** 
(0.3579) 
3.0883*** 
(0.4543) 
0.1747 
(0.3080) 
0.2540** 
(0.1012) 
US 
-4.4075*** 
(1.1308) 
-0.7072*** 
(0.2277) 
1.4457*** 
(0.3868) 
0.3000* 
(0.1765) 
0.1108** 
(0.0554) 
Notes: (
*
)(
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (10)(5)(1)% level respectively. Reported in 
parentheses are standard errors. IP – Domestic Industrial Production, IP* - Foreign Industrial 
Production, RER – bilateral real exchange rate, CHNEX – Chinese exports to Malaysian Trading 
Partners. 
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Table 5a: Error Corrections and Short run Dynamics of Malaysian Exports 
Notes: (
*
)(
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (10)(5)(1)% level respectively. Reported in parentheses are t-
statistics. DMAYEX – Changes of Malaysian exports to trading partners, DIP – Changes of Industrial Production, 
DRER – Changes of Bilateral Real Exchange Rate, DCHNEX – Changes of Chinese exports to Malaysian Trading 
Partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export  
Destination 
Independent Variables 
ECTt-1 
DMALEXt-1 DMALEXt-2 DRERt-1 DRERt-2 DIPt-1 DIPt-2 DCHEXt-1 DCHEXt-2 
Australia 
-0.1003 
[-0.8537]  
-0.3155 
[-0.7089]  
0.4613 
[ 0.7315]  
-0.2448** 
[-2.2405]  
-0.6793*** 
[-4.4951] 
Germany 
-0.4204*** 
[-4.5901]  
0.2632 
[ 0.9529]  
0.2373* 
[ 1.8380]  
0.0579 
[ 0.7118]  
0.0107 
[ 0.1933] 
India 
-0.3243*** 
[-5.0551]  
-1.2223 
[-1.6422]  
-1.5025** 
[-3.6190]  
0.2246** 
[ 2.0894]  
-0.3555*** 
[-5.6888] 
Indonesia 
-0.0408 
[-0.6050]  
0.4915 
[ 0.7167]  
0.1529 
[ 0.2369]  
-0.4022** 
[-2.5815]  
-0.8548*** 
[-9.7435] 
Japan 
-0.4668*** 
[-7.8094]  
0.2333 
[ 1.4562]  
0.1413 
[ 1.5682]  
0.0255 
[ 0.8586]  
-0.0214* 
[-1.8360] 
Korea 
-0.2278*** 
[-3.4206]  
0.1726 
[ 0.6363]  
0.2216 
[ 1.0983]  
-0.0532 
[-0.9625]  
-0.3260*** 
[-5.2306] 
Netherlands 
-0.3709*** 
[-4.1552]  
0.4997 
[ 1.4636]  
0.1145 
[ 0.6401]  
0.1848** 
[ 2.0361]  
0.0167 
[ 0.3800] 
Philippines 
-0.4903*** 
[-6.9672]  
-0.7467 
[-1.0603]  
0.1736 
[ 0.5982]  
0.1035 
[ 1.0872]  
0.0090* 
[ 1.9310] 
Singapore 
-0.3970*** 
[-5.2195] 
-0.1129* 
[-1.54915] 
-0.4601 
[-1.2542] 
-0.0256 
[-0.0697] 
-0.3581*** 
[-3.5451] 
-0.1173 
[-1.3879] 
0.1402** 
[ 3.9201] 
-0.0529 
[-1.4925] 
-0.0869** 
[-2.4775] 
Thailand 
-0.3675*** 
[-6.1324]  
-0.6067 
[-1.67779]  
-0.1409 
[-0.8220]  
0.1191** 
[ 3.3675]  
-0.0143* 
[-1.7167] 
UK 
-0.4879*** 
[-8.1366]  
0.1099 
[ 0.5457]  
0.2428 
[ 1.6685]  
0.0733* 
[ 1.8083]  
0.0288* 
[ 1.7207] 
US 
-0.3912*** 
[-5.7929]  
-0.8641** 
[-2.4698]  
0.8562** 
[ 2.3350]  
0.1254*** 
[ 3.0942]  
-0.1421*** 
[-3.1260] 
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Table 5b: Error Corrections and Short run Dynamics of Malaysian Trade Balance 
Export 
Destination 
Independent Variables 
ECTt-1 
C DMALTBt-1 DMALTBt-2 DIPt-1 DIPt-2 DIP*t-1 DIP*t-2 DRERt-1 DRERt-2 DCHEXt-1 DCHEXt-2 
AUS 
0.1000 
[1.6538] 
-0.2873** 
[-2.3109]  
-0.3009 
[-0.4718]  
0.0950 
[ 0.5617]  
-0.0882** 
[-2.4074]  
0.0243* 
[1.8091]  
-0.2943*** 
[-3.1008] 
GER 
0.0008 
[ 0.0865] 
-0.3293*** 
[-5.5822]  
-0.1965 
[-1.0781]  
0.3378* 
[ 2.2839]  
-0.1523 
[-0.80293]  
-0.0683 
[-1.48706]  
-0.0993*** 
[-4.6024] 
INDIA 
0.0059 
[ 0.2293] 
-0.4827*** 
[-6.7027] 
0.0372 
[ 0.4218] 
0.2725 
[ 0.4350] 
-0.2986 
[-0.4375] 
0.1331 
[ 0.1739] 
-2.3052*** 
[-3.5832] 
-0.1306 
[-0.2141] 
1.0421 
[ 0.7315] 
0.4089 
[ 1.5061] 
0.0384 
[ 0.25935] 
-0.1592*** 
[-4.3364] 
INDO 
-0.0025 
[-0.1628] 
0.0711 
[ 1.1093]  
0.4169 
[ 1.3868]  
-0.0379 
[-0.1788]  
-0.0562 
[-0.2411]  
-0.1438*** 
[-2.7498]  
-0.9020*** 
[-10.7440] 
JAP 
0.0007 
[ 0.0979] 
-0.4529*** 
[-7.6900]  
0.1718 
[ 1.1314]  
-0.5683*** 
[-5.4327]  
-0.1580 
[-0.5960]  
0.1013** 
[ 2.3109]  
-0.0251* 
[-2.1881] 
KOR 
-0.0037 
[-0.2407] 
-0.2837*** 
[-4.4066]  
-0.1314 
[-0.4017]  
0.0213 
[ 0.0722]  
0.2165 
[ 0.4578]  
0.0119 
[ 0.5087]  
-0.1976*** 
[-3.6527] 
NET 
0.0048 
[ 0.2300] 
-0.4320*** 
[-7.4814]  
0.1863 
[ 0.4697]  
-0.7359* 
[-2.1121]  
-0.1729 
[-0.4718]  
-0.0233 
[-0.2455]  
-0.0229** 
[-2.5915] 
PHI 
-0.0085 
[-0.3947] 
-0.4045*** 
[-5.3033]  
-0.1396 
[-0.2983]  
-0.2182 
[-0.5994]  
0.3680 
[ 0.4015]  
0.3681 
[ 1.2410]  
-0.1451*** 
[-2.8010] 
SNG 
-0.0014 
[-0.2483] 
-0.2297** 
[-2.5779] 
-0.2069*** 
[-3.1008] 
0.0004 
[ 0.0030] 
0.0778 
[ 0.6145] 
0.0800 
[ 1.1270] 
-0.0011 
[-0.0180] 
-0.0919 
[-0.2390] 
0.2468 
[ 0.6352] 
0.0118 
[ 0.4072] 
0.0132 
[ 0.44943] 
-0.5976*** 
[-5.7916] 
THA 
-0.0021 
[-0.2273] 
-0.1817** 
[-2.7850]  
0.5229** 
[ 2.9133]  
0.0231 
[ 0.1473]  
0.1418 
[ 0.4115]  
-0.0016 
[-0.0479]  
-0.3650*** 
[-5.8029] 
UK 
0.0005 
[ 0.0561] 
-0.4066*** 
[-6.0491]  
-0.1968 
[-0.8122] 
0.2887 
[ 1.1835] 
-0.1451 
[-0.7147] 
-0.4978*** 
[-2.8697] 
0.3498 
[ 0.8182] 
0.0564 
[ 0.1319] 
-0.0051 
[-0.0853] 
0.1030 
[ 1.75517] 
-0.0741* 
[-2.1441] 
US 
0.0000 
[-0.0011] 
-0.0600 
[-0.9073]  
0.4047* 
[ 1.9923]  
-0.5703 
[-1.1639]  
-0.4527 
[-1.0068]  
-0.0110 
[-0.2064]  
-0.5306*** 
[-7.6938] 
Notes: (
*
)(
**
) (
***
) denotes statistical significance at the (10)(5)(1)% level respectively. Reported in parentheses [   ] are t-statistics. DMAYEX – Changes of Malaysian exports to 
trading partners, DIP – Changes of Industrial Production, DRER – Changes of Bilateral Real Exchange Rate, DCHNEX – Changes of Chinese exports. 
 
 
 
